PAST EXPERIENCE AND ASSUMPTIONS
The title of my paper is "The Impact of Market Changes on Long Term Take-or-pay Export Contracts for LNG and Pipeline Gas from MENA Regions". When addressing this issue, I will draw on experience gained from North West European gas markets. This is done in order to outline how price, pricing mechanisms and quantity arrangements under long term take-or-pay contracts for the supply of LNG, as well as pipeline gas, from the MEN A gas producing regions are likely to be affected by the changes currently taking place in the markets traditionally served by these gas producing areas. The MENA gas producers are seeking new export markets. It can be assumed that some, ifnot all, of the new gas markets also will be subjected to the same market forces as those currently evolving in the established gas markets of particularly Europe but also Japan.
Since I will be dealing with pipeline gas as well and LNG, there will necessarily be some generalisation. This can be done since the basis contractual arrangements in long term take-or-pay gas sales agreements are fundamentally the same, whether gas is transported by a pipeline or as ship borne LNG.
2. CONTRACTING STRUCTURE AND PRICING LNG and gas pipeline projects are capital intensive as well as serving specific geographic markets. This is particularly so in an area being developed as a new or emerging gas market. Under these circumstances, there is no alternative market for the producer to dispose of his gas, when the gas starts flowing under a contract. To secure the required market for the producer and the necessary cash flow to enable him to construct gas production and supply infrastructure, sales arrangements based on takeor-pay commitments were introduced i.e. the buyer accepted an obligation not only to pay for gas quantities taken delivery of but also to pay for certain pre defined quantities of gas whether delivery at this level turned out to be required during a particular supply year or not. Under these arrangements the producer took the risk that the necessary gas reserves existed and could be produced to fulfil his delivery obligation, while the buyer took the market risk. These principles were frequently supported by making the sale and/or purchase an exclusive arrangement in relation to the buyer's geographic market area. A monopoly situation was frequently created to protect the long term gas supply arrangement.
In gas sales agreements entered into to supply European markets, the initial or base price for the supply was normally set in relation to the value of heavy fuel oil and/or gas oil, and sometimes also in relation to the value of a particular basket of crude oils. The price applicable for the delivery of gas during a particular time period would be derived from a fixed pricing arrangement under which the initially agreed price or base price was adjusted from time to time by reference to the movement in the prices of fuels competing with gas and sometimes also elements of crude oil prices and/or inflation.
GAS PRICING ARRANGEMENTS IN GREAT BRITAIN
After the oil price shock of 1973/74 two distinct gas pricing models developed in North West European markets. The first of these models was used by the then 100% state owned British Gas Corporation or BG to supply gas to its monopoly market in Great Britain (England, Scotland and Wales) . In order to stimulate the supply of gas from producers on the UK Continental Shelf, in the early 1980's BG introduced standard price levels and price indexation formulae, based on 100% indexation of a basket of indices, in new gas supply agreements. This basket normally contained gasoil and heavy fueloil price data and industrial inflation. Some contracts in the mid to late 1980's also contained electricity prices in the price indexation basket. An example of the multiplicative price adjustment formula adopted by BG in the period 1983 to 1985 is shown in figure I below. The pricing approach adopted by BG in the 1983/84 was so successful in bringing new volumes of gas to the market, that the base price offered could be dropped at the same time as a top stop price formula based on 100% oil product price indexation could be introduced. This second or "ceiling" price formula would guarantee that the price in the contract would remain competitive in relation to future oil product prices, if these should be falling in real terms.
The early contracts from the 1980's period had 100% take-or-pay commitments, while those signed towards the end of the period typically would have a take-or-pay level of 85% of the annual contract quantity.
None of the gas supply arrangements entered into by BG in the 1980's had price review or price re-opener clauses, although this had been offered by some of the UK producers. Price review clauses were seen by BG to be only in the gas producers favour. Such arrangements would reduce BG's control over the price it paid for its gas supplies.
THE CONTINENTAL NORTH WEST EUROPEAN GAS PRICE
ADJUSTMENT FORMULA The import and re-sale of natural gas in Continental North West European markets was indirectly controlled by fully integrated multinational oil companies. These oil companies did not want to dump gas into this energy market which was one of their most valuable markets for gasoil and heavy fueloil.
A pricing mechanism led to gasoil and heavy fueloil was developed to ensure that the price of gas in end user markets would track those of gasoil and heavy fueloil with a time lag. The structure of this formula, the second distinctive North West European gas pricing model, is shown in Figure 2 below. It relates the border price of gas to the value of gasoil (HEL) and heavy fueloil (HSL) net of all German taxes in specific geographic areas within the German energy market, as reported by the German statistical office in Wiesbaden. This statistical source is viewed by the European gas industry as the most accurate source of energy price data in Europe for energy deliveries to end consumers. Variations of this formula have therefore been accepted by a number of gas importing and exporting countries such as Austria, Belgium, Denmark, France, Norway, Russia, The Netherlands as well as Germany itself. The formula is used for base load as well as mid merit gas supplies. In the 1970's and early 1980's base load agreements would typically have close to 100% take-or-pay commitment, while such contracts signed or adjusted after 1985 typically would have take-or-pay levels in the range of 80% to 90% of the annual contract quantity.
The example price adjustment formula in Figure 2 gives a 60% weighting to gasoil or HEL, while 40% is assigned to heavy fueloil or HSL. This would reflect a gas market with 60% of end consumer demand coming from domestic and commercial customers while industrial demand and power generation would represent 40% of total market demand. This formula is used to adjust the applicable price P, for gas delivered under a specific contract, frequently at the beginning of each calendar quarter.
The factors "fl " and "£2" represent average value adjustments reflecting the cost of transportation of the gas from the border to areas of inland consumption. Thus, these adjustments should allow the buyer to transport the gas from a delivery point on the border to the market areas in which the gasoil or HEL and heavy fueloil or HSL data has been collected from end consumers, and enable the buyer ultimately to sell the gas taken delivery of under the contract in question, at price levels similar to those of gasoil and heavy fueloil in these market areas. The factors "k l " and "k2" are straight energy conversion factors used to translate the price of gasoil or HEL and heavy fueloil or HSL expressed in Deutsche Mark per tonne to prices expressed in pfennigs per kilowatt hour.
When the gas price adjustment formula presented in Figure 2 is used in a country other than Germany, the price P and base price Po are expressed in the local currency. Similarly, the values of gasoil or HEL and heavy fueloil or HSL are converted from Deutsche Mark to the local currency. Detailed statistics for the end consumption of gas are available in all Continental North West European countries. The appropriate weightings of heavy gasoil and heavy fueloil in the gas pricing formula can therefore not only be determined for a country but normally also for a region within a country.
S. PRICING OF SHIP BORNE LNG All LNG supplies from MENA countries to European gas markets are delivered by ship. Long term take-or-pay supplies are frequently priced on the basis of delivery exit seller's shipping terminal i.e. on a "free on board" or f.o.b. basis. Supplies are currently delivered to Belgium, France, Greece, Italy, Spain and Turkey and different pricing models are used for the different trades involved. One pricing model is based on heavy fuel oil and gasoil price indexation. An example of such a model is shown in Figure 3 LNG f.o.b. pricing based on baskets of crude oil prices or crude cocktails does also exist. In its simplest form the applicable price P would be the product of a base price Po and movements of this crude cocktail expressed as a ratio to the crude cocktail's base value. The crude cocktail used could, for example, be the average value in US dollars on a per barrel basis of all crude oils imported during a month by the country in which the LNG will be consumed.
It is today common for European long term LNG take-or-pay supply agreements to contain price review or price re-opener clauses.
PRICE REVIEW PRINCIPLES AND TESTS
Price review or price re-opener clauses were introduced into Continental North West European contracts in the early 1980's. During the late 1970's the price adjustment mechanisms in gas contracts had failed to fully capture the then rapidly increasing value of liquid hydrocarbon products. At the same time it had been observed by both gas producers and their customers that price adjustment clauses normally only functioned as planned over a period of some three years. It was recognised that it might be necessary to adjust the base price and also the indexation in price adjustment formulae at regular intervals during the life of long term gas supply arrangements. This point was driven home during the oil price crash in the second half of 1986. By the end of the 1980's price review mechanisms had been introduced into new as well as existing gas supply arrangements in the Continental North West European market areas. This was not the case in Great Britain. Continental North West European price review clauses are normally based on three main principles. The first of these principles relates to the economic condition or circumstances in the buyer's market area for gas and how these conditions change over time. This first principle applies universally to all gas and its value in the buyer's market area.
This first main principle results in the following two price review tests. It must be demonstrated that:
(I) the economic conditions have changed significantly in the buyer's market area when compared to those which were present when the price adjustment provisions were last agreed and therefore reflected in the applicable price adjustment provisions in the gas sales agreement; and
(2) the changes outlined in (I) above are beyond the control of both the buyer and the seller.
If it can be demonstrated that these two tests can be satisfied, then either the buyer or the seller is entitled to an adjustment of the price provisions in the gas sales agreement. This agreement shall reflect the changes in the economic conditions which have been agreed between the buyer and the seller, or if they have failed to agree, has been determined by an independent arbitrator. Furthermore, this adjustment shall in particular reflect the value of gas in the buyer's end user market area. However, the price adjustment will take into account whether or not the buyer is a prudent and efficient gas company. If this cannot be demonstrated any adjustment will be reduced as the seller will not have to pay for the buyer's inefficiencies.
The second main principle relates to the gas taken delivery of under the gas sales agreement in question (the Sales Gas). This principle has been adopted to protect the buyer's market position since no company can operate a long term gas supply agreement at a loss over a substantial period of time. It gives rise to the following three tests. It must be demonstrated that:
(3) the price adjustment provisions of the gas sales agreement in question allow the buyer to economically market the Sales Gas delivered under the agreement in his natural gas market area;
(4) the buyer shall, in particular, be able to undertake the economic marketing of Sales Gas under (3) above in competition with all competing sources of energy available in the end user market within his natural gas market area; and (5) the buyer's gas marketing practices and physical gas operations are sound and efficient when measured against general business standards in the buyer's country as well as against comparable gas companies in the geographic region.
The outcome of the tests which are defined in (3), (4) and (5), overrides the tests as defined in (l) and (2) above.
If the buyer can demonstrate that these three tests can be satisfied, then he is entitled to an adjustment of the price provisions and/or other commercial provisions in the gas sales agreement which will rectify the Sales Gas' unsatisfactory position in the buyer's natural market.
The third main principle relates to changes in the tax regime for gas and/or competing fuels in the buyer's market. Although taxes and associated tax levels levied on energy are part of the economic conditions or circumstances in the buyer's market and therefore should be covered by the test specified in (I) above, the Continental North West European gas buyers have in some contracts managed to extract separate tax based price review provisions from their gas suppliers.
If it can be demonstrated that a change in the tax regime for gas and/or competing fuels has significant negative economic consequences for the buyer then he can request a separate price review. If tax changes have the opposite effect in the buyer's market, then the seller can request a separate price review.
Some gas sales agreements with Continental North West European buyers contain a fourth main price review principle. This fourth principle specifies that the buyer and the seller of the Sales Gas shall share the economic rent generated by the production and sale of such Sales Gas on an equitable basis. This provides a guarantee to the buyer as well as the seller, that provided the tests which are based on the first two main price review principles have been met in full, one party will not be able to make an undue profit, when compared to the profit of the other party, as a result of the gas sales agreement in question.
Price review based on an equitable sharing of economic rent can be very valuable to the sellers during periods of low energy prices. This principle, if adopted in a gas sales agreement, will prevent the buyer from receiving a guaranteed margin on the Sales Gas at the same time as the seller operates at a loss. To be effective for the seller, price review provisions based on this principle must override or be allowed to be balanced against the contract specific tests set out in (3) and (4) above.
It should also be mentioned that the normal definition of economic rent excludes all taxes and imposts which are levied against the product forming the basis for the sale which the economic rent is calculated for. In the case of gas, the government of the buyer's country can therefore introduce a gas tax and as a consequence reduce the economic rent available to be shared between the buyer and the seller and therefore the price which the buyer has to pay for the Sales Gas delivered under a contract. The treatment of a gas tax and/or a similar impost under price review based on economic rent principles must, as a result of the economic rent definition, also be tied to the tax based price review provisions in a gas sales agreement.
A fundamental principle of all price review arrangements is that a price review recognition or arbitration shall not in any way disrupt the flow of gas under a gas sales agreement. Delivery nominations and the supply of gas will take place in accordance with normal operations under a contract even if there should be disagreement between the buyer and the seller as a result of a price review.
Price review requests, negotiations and arbitrations all take place behind closed doors in private court hearings. Furthermore, the Continental North West European gas industry is shrouded in secrecy and has built effective barriers around all its commercial activities. As a result of this situation hardly any information is available in the public domain about the practical operation of price review clauses in Continental Europe or indeed elsewhere in the world.
GAS LIBERALISATION AND PRICE SHOCKS IN GREAT BRITAIN
From being the largest fully integrated gas monopoly in the world, the gas market in Great Britain has today reached an advanced stage of liberalisation. An effective separation of the ownership of gas infrastructure and the mercantile function of gas market players has been introduced. Fully transparent regimes for third party access to on-shore gas transmission, storage and distribution systems are in place. Full liberalisation and effective competition has been achieved in all sectors of the end consumer gas market. There are no longer any hurdles for the entry of new players into the gas market of Great Britain.
Legally BG had lost its monopoly in the contract gas market already in 1982, but effective competition started to emerge first in the early I990s. Although the privati sed BG at this time was rapidly losing market share, it continued to be an active buyer of new gas supplies under long term take-or-pay agreements without price review or price re-opener clauses in the same way as BG had operated when it was the monopoly gas supplier. This gas procurement was done in head on competition with new market entrants.
As a result of this market behaviour there was a perceived shortage of gas in Great Britain with prices exit producers shore terminals rising rapidly from the equivalent of some 70% of crude oil parity in 1988 to a peak of some 140% of crude oil parity in 1994/95. In addition to BG, newly privatised power generators, independent power projects and new gas marketing companies were all signing up long term near 100% take-or-pay agreements with price indexation formulae similar to the one presented in Figure I , and more importantly, without price review provisions.
Gas prices at 140% of crude oil parity together with greatly improved gas exploration and production techniques created a bonanza for UK gas producers. However, this came to an abrupt end in the spring of 1995 when the price of short term gas supplies fell to less than 50% of crude oil values.
THE DEMISE OF BG
Already in 1992 it was becoming apparent that BG was harbouring a rapidly growing and very serious take-or-pay problem under its long term gas supply agreements. In spite of this situation the company continued to be an active buyer in the gas market until late 1994. The combined effect of the price drop in 1995 and the loss of market share was that British Gas Trading, the gas marketing arm of BG, faced a take-or-pay problem which in total was estimated to represent a potential liability of some £40 billion, equivalent to more than US$ 60 billion. This take-or-pay problem was mainly related to the high priced depletion type of gas supply contracts entered into between 1980 and 1990, the so called "legacy" contracts.
BG was forced to re-negotiate most of these "legacy" agreements on the basis that the absence of price review or price re-opener clauses in these contracts were causing economic hardship to the company in the form of a continuing obligation to pay higher than market prices for large volumes of gas which the company no longer needed. The cost of re-negotiating the "legacy" contracts have been very high to BG and its successor gas trading company Centrica, which now owns British Gas Trading. The total cost of this re-negotiation process is difficult to estimate but it is likely to be in the region of several billion US dollars.
BG and its gas market successor Centrica were not the only companies suffering from having entered into too highly priced take-or-pay agreements. A number of gas marketing companies which were established in the early 1990s and the privatised generators National Power and PowerGen have all suffered major losses on their takeor-pay gas contracts. There has been a flurry of court cases and arbitrations in England related to long term gas contracts entered into between 1990 and 1995. The English courts have allowed some high priced contracts to be terminated based on technicalities, such as Total Gas Marketing Limited's supply contract with Arco British Limited and partners for gas from the Trent gas field on the UK continental shelf.
GAS LIBERALISATION IN CONTINENTAL EUROPE
Gas liberalisation and limited gas to gas competition had started in parts of Continental Europe before the European Union Gas Directive had been approved in 1998. These market changes have come at a time when there is a substantial oversupply of gas available to Continental North West European gas markets. Furthermore, this oversupply has coincided with exceptionally low gas prices at wholesale level due to the very low petroleum product prices experience in 1998 and early 1999.
The oversupply has been triggered by two sets of events. Large improvements in the economics of new gas production projects have been made due to technological developments. This has taken place when the large gas monopolies in Continental Europe have extended existing long term gas supply arrangements prior to the implementation of the European Union Gas Directive. In countries such as Holland, local gas distribution companies and energy intensive users have started contracting for gas supplies in competition with Gasunie, the old monopoly supplier. Gas supplies from new and expanded production projects have been brought to the market as a result. This increased production capacity became available at the same time as economic activities in the world were falling and gas consumption in Continental European markets were expanding at slower rates than anticipated.
When the European Union Gas Directive comes into force in member states in August of the year 2000, at least 20 per cent of the total annual gas consumption of a country must be opened for competition. The opening of these markets is initially restricted to gas fuelled power generators and customers consuming more than 25 million cubic metres of gas per year on a site. The percentage of a market available for competition must be increased to 20 per cent of the total annual gas consumption in the year 2005. Unless monopoly buyers release gas supplies from existing supply agreements or start selling gas to consumers in areas outside their monopolies, the current Continental North West European oversupply situation is likely to worsen dramatically in a similar fashion to that which was observed in Great Britain in 1995. Such a Continental North West European market scenario, if it should materialise, would have a knock on effect on all European gas markets.
GAS SUPPLIERS AND EUROPEAN MARKET LIBERALISATION
Before addressing the likely impact on gas supply arrangements of the market changes currently being implemented in Europe, it is useful to take a step back and to realise or understand why European gas markets are being liberalised. The main reason why the European Union, supported by individual governments, has introduced a strict programme of market liberalisation, is the need to improve the general economic competitiveness of the region. This is particularly so in relation to the economies of the United States, Japan and some of the countries in South East Asia. The west European country which took the lead, not only in improving general economic competitiveness, but also in improving the supply conditions for gas and electricity to end consumers, was the United Kingdom, or more precisely Great Britain. As a result of its energy liberalisation programme, gas prices net of taxes paid by end consumers in Great Britain, have in real terms since 1990 fallen by 43% in the industrial sector and by some 18% in the domestic sector. These very substantial savings and their positive impact on the UK economy could not be ignored by other governments in Europe. A European wide programme of gas liberalisation with the aim of achieving savings similar to those obtained in Great Britain was agreed.
Having established that the Iiberalisation process is drive by a desire to reduce gas costs to end consumers it is appropriate to ask the question "who will be paying for the gas liberalisation process? In order to answer this question it is necessary to examine what role the price review provisions in long term take-or-pay gas supply agreements will play in dealing with the market forces which are in the process of being released by gas Iiberalisation programmes in Continental European gas markets.
Based on the experience of Great Britain, the provisions of the European Union Gas Directive and current developments in Continental Europe, the structural changes which are likely to take place in national gas markets by the year 2005, are likely to be substantial. This is the year when as a minimum 28% of the gas consumption in each member country must be open for competition. These structural changes most likely will be such that the general economic conditions and circumstances will become significantly different from those which were present when current gas price arrangements and price adjustment provisions were agreed. It is therefore probable that these changes should satisfy the requirements for a price review under the first main principle in the price review arrangements presented in section 6 of this paper.
Secondly, price reviews have already been triggered in Continental European gas markets on the basis of gas to gas competition. This has been done under the second main principle of the price review arrangements and it is the fourth test defined in section 6, which provides the basis for such a request. It is expected that a number of price review requests will be made in Continental European gas markets based on gas to gas competition after the year 2000.
The exceptionally low gas price currently experienced in the wholesale markets of Continental European countries could create further problems for gas producers. It is easy for governments to introduce new taxes or increase tax levels during periods of low prices. Germany has already announced its intention to introducing new energy taxes. Other countries are likely to follow this example. The Austrian government has introduced a gas tax as a pure fiscal measure and the UK government intends to introduce energy taxes on industry supposedly for environmental reasons. The introduction of any such taxes is likely to give rise to additional price reviews under gas supply agreements.
What will be the likely effect of a series of price reviews on existing gas supply arrangements? It is likely that the prices in the higher priced contracts will be reduced at the same time as a portion of the sales volume under existing high take-or-pay agreements will be released from contracts. An alternative to the part release of the sales volume is to reduce the take-or-pay level in a gas sales agreement and as a consequence increase the delivery flexibility under the agreement.
It is clear from this that the party which is likely to carry the main burden of liberalising the Continental European gas market at a wholesale level will be the gas producing companies, whether located within the European region or elsewhere. This is particularly so in gas supply agreements which do not include the fourth main price review principle presented in section 6 of this paper. This is the principle which is based on an equitable sharing of the economic rent generated by gas production and its sale. It has been observed that producers may carry some 70% of gas market liberalisation costs in markets with gas oversupply, when the equitable sharing safeguard has been omitted from price review provisions in gas supply contracts. This is in sharp contrast to what gas producers have experienced in Great Britain. Here, long term gas supply agreements did not contain price review clauses and the gas buyers at the wholesale level, ended up absorbing most of the costs associated with gas market liberalisation.
II. MENA GAS SUPPLY ARRANGEMENTS AND EUROPEAN BUYERS MENA countries are currently supplying pipeline gas and LNG under long term takeor-pay supply arrangements to a total of eight European countries. Belgium, France, Turkey and Greece receive gas in the form of LNG, while Italy and Spain receive both LNG and pipeline gas. Finally, Portugal and Slovenia, which used to be part of the former Yugoslavia, currently receive pipeline gas only.
Markets for MENA gas located within Continental North Western Europe are most at risk due to changes caused by gas market liberalisation. Belgium and France, both in this part of Europe, have access to pipeline gas from The Netherlands, Norway, Russia and the UK. Pricing of pipeline gas deliveries to Belgium and the north western part of France is likely to become increasingly independent of the price of liquid petroleum products as has been observed in Great Britain. An informal spot or over the counter (OTC) market for gas operates based on physical delivery at Zeebrugge, Belgium. A European industry working party is in the process of finalising terms and conditions for a Zeebrugge standard trading contract. Zeebrugge, where gas from Algeria, The Netherlands, Norway, Russia and the UK meet, is a European gas hub of growing importance. The Zeebrugge spot market is likely to have an increasing influence on the future pricing of gas in Belgium and France. Belgium and France's ability to pay crude oil related LNG prices for gas supplies from MENA countries is therefore likely to diminish in the future.
Italy and Spain both have expanding gas markets. Both are located close to MENA gas producers in North Africa while their gas markets are not easily accessible for producers located outside the MENA regions, with the exception of Russian gas delivered to northern Italy. The geographic location and expanding natures of these markets are likely to give some protection for existing MENA contracts against price erosion and gas delivery flexibility increases resulting from market liberalisation.
Greece and Portugal are classified as emerging gas markets areas by the European Union. These two countries will therefore have delayed introductions of market liberalisation. Turkey and Slovenia are not yet members of the European Union and it is likely that there will be a delay in the introduction of market liberalisation in these two countries.
In conclusion, MENA LNG and pipeline gas exports to Continental European markets will be effected by the gas liberalisation process taking place within the European Union. LNG supplies to Belgium and France are most exposed to change. It is impossible to predict the full impact on the supply of gas from MENA countries of the market changes currently emerging in Continental European gas markets. However, it is possible to say that crude oil and petroleum product related pricing will be much more difficult to obtain in the future, and that the value of delivery flexibility is likely to be reduced for as long as surplus gas quantities exist in the European gas markets, if not for longer.
FUTURE PRICE ADJUSTMENT METHODS
In early 1990s a spot or over the counter (OTC) market for gas developed in Great Britain. Although there was no obligation to report deals conducted in the OTC market, detailed price reports and price indices soon appeared in the public domain. From small beginnings, the OTC market is now playing an important role within the gas market in Great Britain.
The International Petroleum Exchange in London (IPE) has for some 3 years operated a standard Natural Gas Futures Contract which is rapidly gaining popularity among all players in the gas market of Great Britain. Dealings are screen based, and buyers and sellers operate on an anonymous basis in this market which records all transactions conducted. Price information from the IPE screen based system is now being used both to set the base price and to adjust this over time in a number of short to medium term gas supply arrangements in Great Britain. A gas sales agreement for in excess of 5 BCM with deliveries due to begin in 2001 and lasting for 10 years which was entered into in February 1998 by Centrica and Enron, has a price provision based on the screen based IPE Natural Gas Futures Contract. This no doubt is the way pricing of even long term gas supply arrangements in Great Britain is developing. Pricing arrangements in the Iiberalised gas market in Great Britain seem to mirror the situation in the USA where some 80 to 90% of all gas sold in the wholesale market is priced either directly or through market indices based on the spot or futures markets.
As has been observed in the USA and Great Britain, natural gas tends to find its own price level in liberalised gas markets. This is particularly so during periods of extreme energy prices. This was observed during the 1998/99 winter when gas deliveries in Great Britain with prices based on price data from the GTC market or the IPE's Natural Gas Futures Contract, enjoyed prices which were higher than wholesale gas price, with full linkage to gasoil and heavy fueloil, available in Continental North West European markets. This situation will be reversed during the 1999/2000 winter. Petroleum product based gas prices for fourth quarter 1999 deliveries to Continental European buyers are now some 30% higher than the market related spot and futures prices in Great Britain for this calendar quarter.
It is likely to take years before the gas markets in Continental North Western Europe will be sufficiently liberalised to allow the launch and operation of natural gas futures contracts based on trading locations and physical gas supplies within this market area. However, before such natural gas futures contracts could become reliable as well as operational there is no reason why the Continental North West European gas markets could not use price data from the IPE's UK based Natural gas Futures Contract together with a "delivery point" adjustment factor. When the Zeebrugge standard trading contract has been launched and becomes established, price data from this GTC market could also be used for the pricing of gas under long term supply arrangements.
It can be argued that at least if not two price reviews under existing take-or-pay supply agreements will be required in the next four to six years due to market forces released by gas liberation. Due to the changes which are likely to take place in Continental North West European gas markets, price reviews are likely to be so time consuming and cumbersome that the current system of price adjustment will be changed. The additive formula for gas price adjustment presented in Figure 2 is already coming under pressure from market forces. It is understood that changes are being made to price adjustment formulae based on this model during price review negotiations currently taking place. The process of change is already well under way.
In the long term, the most likely system to replace the current price adjustment formulae operated together with price reviews will be to adopt pricing based on GTC spot markets and natural gas futures contracts as has happened in the USA and Great Britain. Such a development will transform not only pricing in the Continental North West European gas market but also the way buyers and sellers operate in this market.
A number of trading instruments have been developed which allow the hedging of prices and other market risks resulting from longer term gas supply arrangements. Even insurance products are being developed to counter abnormal market risks associated with gas contracts.
The Norwegian state oil company Statoil has for a number of years operated in the UK spot and futures markets through its UK gas trading and marketing subsidiary Alliance Gas. Statoil is also actively trading at Zeebrugge in Belgium. Gazprom of Russia has now also formally entered the UK spot market and the spot market developing in Zeebrugge. Gazprom UK Trading Limited has been established in London in order to operate a tripartite agreement for the transportation and trading of gas with Centrica of Great Britain and WINGAS of Germany (35% Gazprom owned). In addition to using Gazprom UK Trading Limited as a means for keeping abreast of gas market developments in Europe, this company will also be an important instrument for the Russians in operating arbitrage trading between Bacton in Great Britain and Zeebrugge in Continental Europe.
To prepare for future changes in the European gas market MENA producers should follow the examples set by Statoil and Gazprom. They should already today start using trading instruments, price hedging and insurance policies to protect their market positions. Participation in such activities would also place MENA producers at the leading edge of a rapidly developing European gas market. This will provide the MENA producers with experience which will come to good use when the gas markets of Japan and other Far Eastern markets implement not only gas but also electricity liberalisation programmes.
